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The Security Apparatus and the British Left, 1950s–2000s (Part I)  
 
Abstract 
 
This paper (Part I and Part II forthcoming) takes its inspiration from the ongoing 
Undercover Policing Inquiry into past undercover police operations in the United 
Kingdom, but takes a wider perspective and employs a longer historical trajectory to 
explore the political terrain underpinning the domestic activities of the Security 
Service and Special Branch vis-à-vis predominantly left-wing and/or radical groups 
during and after the Cold War. The goal is to augment the scholarly understanding of 
the role of intelligence gathering in order to defend the State against groups and 
individuals deemed to pose a threat to national security and/or public order. Part I 
presented here explores the histories, possibilities and dilemmas of undercover 
policing of, and intelligence gathering among, political groups and the evergreen 
communist and ‘far and wide left’ threats that were historically perceived as 
menacing the United Kingdom.   
 
Keywords: security; intelligence; police; political violence; subversion; protest.  
 
In July 2015, the Undercover Policing Inquiry set out its terms of reference for the 
investigation of undercover policing units that have operated in England and Wales 
since 1968, with a particular focus on the now-disbanded Special Demonstration 
Squad (SDS) and National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU). These two elite 
units utilized a clandestine approach typical of systems of ‘high policing’ 1  that 
secretly observe and disrupt (often left-wing) political groups considered to pose a 
threat of public disorder, political violence and/or subversion. The Inquiry reports to 
the Home Office and is expected to last until at least mid-2018. The Inquiry seeks to 
undertake an assessment of creditable and discreditable conduct2 by managers and 
operatives and to uncover various elements, such as these units’ contribution to crime 
prevention and detection; the scope of undercover policing operations and their effect 
on the public; the government’s awareness of undercover operations; the regulation, 
authorization and oversight of undercover policing; and undercover police officers’3 
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selection, training, management and care.4 Police requested selected hearings to be 
heard in secret to protect covert deployments and the identities of the undercover 
officers.5  
Amid media debates, scandals and speculations about the activities of the SDS 
and the NPOIU between 1968 and 2011, there is a lack of discussion on the political 
terrain within which these particular units, and also the security apparatus as a whole, 
operated during that period, while predominantly but not exclusively targeting left-
wing and/or radical political groups. In exploring the roles of both the Security 
Service and Special Branch (as a partner or adjunct of the Security Service),6 this 
paper, which is divided into two parts (Part I here and Part II forthcoming), takes a 
holistic and historical view of ‘political’ surveillance and policing. The relationship 
between the Security Service and the police goes back to the foundation of the former 
in 1909, when the first director general of the Security Service, Vernon Kell, was 
tasked with investigating German espionage and, in order to do so, made a nationwide 
tour of all police forces and drew on the experience of William Melville, a former 
head of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB).7 The relationship between 
the Security Service and the MPSB remained secret for over fifty years and only 
became public in Lord Denning’s 1963 report on the ‘Profumo Affair.’ In the 1960s, 
police forces outside the city of London started developing their own Special 
Branches, too, in order to respond to Cold-War-related threats from espionage and 
subversion, which formed the main focus of the work of the Security Service during 
that period. The relationship between the Security Service and Special Branches was 
codified in 1984, when a set of Home Office guidelines for chief constables spelled 
out the relationship between the two and their roles.8  
Special Branches would therefore continue to police their own local areas and 
to maintain public order but would also operate as a medium between the Security 
Service and the overall police service. In this respect, Special Branch’s role was to 
assist the Security Service by collecting information that could support national 
security intelligence work.9 By inquiring into the role of the Security Service and its 
relationship with Special Branch – and necessarily the SDS, an undercover police unit 
located within the MPSB – this paper seeks to shed new light on the subject. Here, it 
is important to note that the undercover operations of the NPIOU differed 
considerably from those of the SDS, insofar as the former’s appear to have had a 
predominantly (if not sole) police public order focus and no close relationship with 
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the Security Service.  
Methodologically, Parts I and II of this paper bring together a range of diverse 
sources that can help provide a history that is certainly not conclusive yet offers a 
series of original and well-focused snapshots, presented in chronological order, of the 
security activities conducted against various British left-wing and/or radical political 
groups between the 1950s and the 2000s. These sources include the following: 
historical documents released by the MPSB and the Home Office10 that have never 
before been analyzed holistically and/or published in a scholarly article; academic and 
non-academic literatures across the orthodox and critical spectra; reports from various 
bodies and organizations; and open source material, all of which help in analyzing the 
political context in which Special Branch and the Security Service operated during 
and after the Cold War, in order to understand the ‘enemies’ that the British State 
deemed worth monitoring and defeating. 
To start with, Part I of this paper considers the specific evolution of 
undercover policing of political groups involved in protest and the often tense 
relationship between security and liberty. Subsequently, it zooms out to explore the 
communist and ‘far and wide left’ threat that concerned government, the Security 
Service and Special Branch during the Cold War and that created an anti-Cold-War 
intelligence mentality that would continue well after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1991. Part II of the paper (forthcoming) then explores some of the left-wing and/or 
radical protest groups that the security apparatus monitored in order to neutralize real 
and perceived political and criminal threats to the State and society. Lastly, it 
discusses a more recent target of police activities, namely the Radical 
Environmentalist and Animal Rights (REAR) movement, and the amorphous and 
elusive threat that its more militant fringe has posed to society. Overall, the paper 
cannot touch on all of the left-wing and/or radical groups that utilized means 
threatening national security and/or public order in pursuance of communist, 
Trotskyist, anarchist, pacifist, anti-capitalist, environmentalist and animal rights 
causes, among many others. Instead, the paper seeks to present selected examples, in 
largely chronological order, of the mutable and polymorphous ‘enemies’ standing on 
the left of the political spectrum that the security apparatus faced between the 1950s 
and the 2000s, and the ways in which their real and perceived threats expressed 
themselves and were countered by the State. 
 
 4 
Undercover Policing of Political Groups: Histories, Possibilities and Dilemmas 
From its foundation as the Special Irish Branch in 1883 and until it was subsumed 
within the Counter Terrorism Command (CTC/SO15) in 2006, the Metropolitan 
Police Special Branch (MPSB/SO12) dealt with several groups and individuals posing 
a threat of public disorder, political violence and/or subversion, such as Irish 
republicans; anarchists; Bolsheviks; suffragettes; fascists; Zionist extremists; Arab, 
Middle Eastern and Islamist terrorists; environmental and animal rights extremists; 
foreign spies; British traitors; and many others.11 Before moving to the CTC eleven 
years ago, the MPSB was divided into two Operational Command Units that dealt 
with, on the one hand, counterterrorism and counter-extremism and, on the other 
hand, security at international ports and nationwide protection of public figures and 
prominent foreign visitors who did not fall within the remit of the Royal Protection 
Command (SO14) 12  or the Diplomatic Protection Group (SO16). 13  The MPSB 
worked through seven squads holding different responsibilities: ‘A’ Squad – close 
protection; ‘B’ Squad – Irish republican terrorism; ‘C’ Squad – domestic extremism; 
‘D’ Squad – naturalization enquiries; ‘E’ Squad – international terrorism; ‘P’ Squad – 
policing at ports; and ‘S’ Squad – the SDS, support for covert operations including 
surveillance, communications, prison liaison, European liaison and others.14 
The SDS played a key role within the MPSB and, later, the CTC until the unit 
was disbanded in 2008. The SDS operated within the ‘S’ Squad and liaised with the 
Security Service.15 The public interest driving its activities was the management of 
“potentially dangerous public order issues” 16 and the enhancement of the police’s 
understanding of organizations that engage in politically motivated criminality. It 
started with just twelve members in 196817 and recruited over a hundred officers from 
the MPSB over the following forty years. During that period, SDS officers infiltrated 
“several hundred [about 460] activist groups, including almost every activist group 
assessed to be capable of causing potential public order issues, as well as a number of 
terrorist groups.” 18  These groups were originally left-wing extremists, but later 
encompassed the far right, Irish terrorists and animal rights extremists too. Around 
1996 or 1997, the unit shifted its operational focus away from public disorder and 
mass demonstrations alone to include long-term activities gathering intelligence on 
individuals with less interest in demonstrations,19 although this may have been the 
case also for some operations at earlier points in the SDS’s history. A CTC report20 
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compiled in 2009 argues that this shift led the SDS to operate with increasing tactical 
latitude, targeting peripheral subjects and focusing on long-term, future-oriented 
strategic intelligence on extremist, subversive and other groups of potential interest to 
the police, the Security Service and the government.  
This operational move encapsulates the fault lines that separate law 
enforcement operations from intelligence gathering activities, insofar as “intelligence 
is all about the future and is designed to enable action in the face of continuing 
doubt.” 21  Intelligence therefore inhabits the vast world of the unpredictable that 
stretches beyond the mere collection of “the communications of adversaries or of the 
guilty.” 22  The SDS’s objectives encompassed a stronger focus on understanding 
“where a target organisation would be in five years and who would be leading or 
directing them,” a goal that the unit successfully achieved by “engineer[ing] their 
field officers into key positions within target groups.”23 Short-term, ‘here-and-now’ 
tactical intelligence, which had constituted the original objective of the unit, became 
secondary to the long-term goal of assessing targeted organizations. But while some 
of the organizations targeted throughout the SDS’s forty years of existence were 
largely peaceful, other organizations not only engaged in minor public order offences 
but also “did participate in significant criminality ranging from offences of criminal 
damage to the planting of incendiary devices and a range of terrorist activity.”24  
The unit maintained a flexible approach to undercover officers committing 
low-level crimes, holding important positions in the targeted groups, becoming 
involved in meetings and activities and going along with activists in order to maintain 
cover. At least twenty-six officers were arrested over a total of fifty-three occasions 
and, on nine of these occasions, used their undercover identities in court.25 Frederick 
Forsyth’s bestselling novel The Day of the Jackal offered inspiration for the 
controversial use of dead children’s identities as a way to create ‘legends’ (covert 
identities). Out of the approximately 146 officers that served in the SDS, there is a 
record of at least 106 covert identities being employed: at least forty-two of these 
identities used the details of a deceased child while forty-five other identities used a 
fictitious identity whose provenance is yet to be established.26 The NPOIU borrowed 
and utilized this technique, the revelation of which would later spark public outrage 
among target groups and their sympathizers and which would help make the case for 
the Undercover Policing Inquiry. Whether other covert units of the British police, or 
the intelligence agencies, ever used the same practice is unclear, although the Secret 
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Intelligence Service is believed not to utilize dead children’s identities “for fear of 
legal action by angry relatives if the operation should go wrong and be publicly 
exposed.”27  
The activities of the SDS have received both praise and criticism. The 
independent investigation into the SDS, called ‘Operation Herne,’ found that the 
unit’s clandestine activities had included exaggerations as to “the involvement of SDS 
officers and the value of their intelligence [, … which] would not be the only occasion 
where members of a unit embellished their importance and success in order to secure 
finance.”28 At the same time, ‘Operation Herne’ praised the unit for a series of “brave 
and innovative operations that [… had been] undertaken and some hugely courageous 
and good covert operatives who [had] provided a valuable service in keeping the 
communities of London and further afield safe over many years.”29  
A similar unit, the NPOIU, emerged in 1999 within the Metropolitan Police 
Service (MPS). Funded by the Home Office30 and overseen by the Association of 
Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Public Order Sub-Committee and ACPO’s Terrorism 
and Allied Matters, 31 the NPOIU incorporated the Animal Rights National Index 
(ARNI), which had originally been set up in 1986 in order to monitor the activities of 
violent animal rights groups. The NPOIU’s establishment saw the direct involvement 
of some of the United Kingdom’s most prominent police officers of that era (some of 
whom had also had responsibility for the SDS):32 Commanders of the MPSB Barry 
Moss and Roger Pearce; Assistant Commissioner for Special Operations of the MPSB 
David Veness; Assistant Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police Tim Hollis; and 
Assistant Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Paul Blewitt. 33  Some police 
forces wanted the NPOIU to include within its remit travelers and main sports events, 
which were instead covered by the Northern Intelligence Unit and the Southern 
Intelligence Unit.34 Eventually, the NPOIU established itself in a secret location in 
London35 and gathered, analyzed and disseminated intelligence on animal rights and 
environmental extremist activities and other political extremist and/or protest 
activities involving a serious threat of criminality and public disorder.36 This was a 
period when animal rights and environmental groups had started “innovative tactics to 
frustrate authorities,” while some of their members operated “in cell like structures in 
a quasi-terrorist mode to keep secret their movements and intentions.”37 
Officers were initially selected from the MPSB,38 and many were seconded 
from the ‘C’ Squad,39 and via a process that assessed their knowledge of domestic 
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extremism, operational experience and capacity to handle informants.40 They inserted 
themselves within target groups, attending meetings, sometimes offering transport 
to/from events and reporting the affiliates of protest groups. Occasionally, they 
committed low-level offences, such as aggravated trespass, breaches of the peace, 
assaults on police officers, criminal damage and so on.41 The unit essentially operated 
as a “national response to public protest generating violence and civil disruption 
[… and] was deployed to gather coordinated intelligence rather than evidence which 
could be used to support criminal prosecutions.” 42  It also provided operational 
support to police forces needing such intelligence and acted both as a coordination 
point for Special Branch units43 in the country and as a contact point between the 
United Kingdom and other European police forces.44 The Northern Intelligence Unit 
and the Southern Intelligence Unit acted as satellite units of the NPOIU.45 
 At the time of the NPOIU’s establishment, intelligence-led policing sourced 
its information from informants, communities, activist magazines, newspapers and the 
Internet. The official sources for public order intelligence were the data systems of 
individual forces, the MPS Public Order Intelligence System, Special Branches, the 
Northern and Southern Intelligence Units and the National Criminal Intelligence 
Services.46 The NPOIU maintained very close links to the ACPO, the National Crime 
Intelligence Service, local public order intelligence units, the European Liaison 
Section and Special Branch in a process of mutual exchange, control, verification 
and/or analysis of intelligence.47The unit also provided intelligence to the Ministry of 
Defence Police (MDP) to help assess the threat from anti-nuclear, anti-arms and 
animal rights groups that fell within its operational remit. The MDP’s intelligence was 
collated with intelligence received from the Security Service (Irish-related terrorism 
and international terrorism), the MPSB (Irish-related terrorism in Great Britain) and 
the Defence Intelligence Staff (Irish-related terrorism in Northern Ireland) to inform 
the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Counter Extremism Advisory Group’s (CEAG’s) 
assessment of the threat from terrorism to Security Service and MOD establishments 
in the country. The MOD CEAG provided a monthly terrorist assessment of the threat 
to establishments, individuals and events based on a six-tier level system of threat. 
The MOD CEAG also set the now-defunct BIKINI state on non-specific threats to be 
displayed at the entrance of government buildings and military establishments.48  
The NPOIU has received intense scrutiny for a series of convictions where the 
lack of surviving records made it difficult to ascertain whether undercover officers 
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had undertaken direct action in the activities leading to the activists’ arrest.49 Material 
generated through deployments was not revealed to investigators and prosecutors 
during the criminal proceedings. Moreover, undercover officers knew that some 
elements of the prosecution cases presented by police witnesses were false. The lack 
of communication between various actors in the criminal justice system became 
particularly evident in the collapse of the trial against environmental activists charged 
with conspiracy to commit aggravated trespass when attempting to shut down the 
Ratcliffe-on-Soar Power Station in Nottinghamshire in 2009. This case highlights a 
failure to distribute the authorization of former NPOIU officer Mark Kennedy and the 
transcript of his audio recording to the relevant police officers and to the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS). This failure also led to a lack of proper disclosure to the 
defense and resulted in the CPS charging the activists without knowledge of the 
existence of an undercover officer.50 In the case of the SDS, its complete secrecy 
(partly to protect officers’ safety and the effectiveness of undercover tactics),51 an 
intelligence-oriented doctrine and a policy of non-disclosure within the unit deprived 
“the trial process of the proper opportunity to consider the importance of an 
undercover deployment connected to activists who were arrested and prosecuted 
[… and constituted] a serious procedural irregularity in the process designed to ensure 
a fair trial.”52  
These assessments speak to the heart of the evergreen threat that undercover 
policing and intelligence gathering pose to fair and open trials,53 civil liberties and 
just prosecutions. 54 A recent small-scale study conducted among British activists, 
who had faced disruptive and deterrent physical surveillance and other intelligence 
gathering tactics, highlights the issue of “maintaining security within decentralised 
groups [in which] people do not usually become involved in political protest with the 
express intention, from the outset, of breaking the law.”55 In the groups under study, 
revelations about Mark Kennedy’s true identity contributed to a decline in 
environmental direct action, decreased the bonds of trust within the groups and 
tightened circles of activists, who eventually isolated themselves from the public. But 
while infiltration is often considered a matter of fact56 and paranoia is an ever-present 
feature during the life course of politically active groups, 57  activists continue to 
organize in traditional ways that do not effectively respond to ongoing shifts of state 
security and to the novel methods of surveillance and disruption allowed by modern 
technologies.58 
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A recent ethnographic study exploring the secret world of covert police 
investigations identified a “tendency of officers to request the most intrusive means 
[, often entailing surveillance, which] speaks to the proverbial sense of mission [… ,] 
a residue of which is an exaggerated preference for fervent policing tactics.”59 Unlike 
routine investigative work, undercover policing is secret, unpredictable, less 
accountable and inclined to error.60 But the relationship between investigative work 
and undercover policing is not dichotomous: police work per se is bound to a degree 
of secrecy and to some restrictions of information that “will always deny complete 
accountability or complete transparency.”61 However, it is true that the use of covert 
tactics by law enforcement agencies “raises sensitive legal concerns about how the 
role of the police in society should be distinguished from that of intelligence 
agencies.”62 Jacqueline Ross aptly notes that 
 
In most modern European democracies, infiltration did not gain ground 
as an accepted investigative tactic until recently; suffering from myriad 
associations with totalitarianism, it was reintroduced into Europe in the 
1970s to assist in fighting domestic terrorism, and was later adapted to 
the war against drugs. It was only in the 1990s that Germany, France, 
and Italy enacted legislation designed to legalize a tactic that occupied 
an ambiguous role at the margins of accepted investigative activity.63 
 
The blurred lines between both (a) preventative and repressive police functions and 
(b) intelligence pursuit and collection make the case for the ‘necessary’ but ‘evil’ 
nature of undercover policing. 64  Undercover policing can certainly represent the 
embodiment of the ‘noble lie,’65 particularly when considered through the ethical lens 
of liability that postulates that “those who engage in wrongdoing make themselves 
morally liable to preventative activities”66 and that goes as far as to concede that 
“sometimes it will be useful for covert police to deceive or manipulate those who are 
uninvolved in any criminal wrongdoing.”67 But even when the infringement of rights 
of an innocent party is on balance justified (e.g. a small intrusion resulting in a great 
security benefit), it still produces a complaint that must be morally addressed. 68 
Moreover, the absence of safeguards typical of overt justice processes 69  and the 
threats to the due process model that are inherent in covert tactics have ramifications 
for how undercover policing is theorized and operationalized in different jurisdictions. 
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In Germany, the ‘evil’ nature of undercover policing relates to the fact that it 
compromises the targets’ rights, jeopardizes constitutionally mandated separations 
between different powers of the executive, endangers the integrity of the police and 
problematizes the limits of the exercise of governmental power. In the United States, 
undercover policing is not legally or morally particularly problematic but becomes 
dangerous when it is abused, for example if used to entrap someone or if control and 
accountability are lacking.70  
In the United Kingdom, research demonstrates that undercover officers can 
“become engrossed in, and occasionally sympathetic to, the lives of those they are 
investigating.”71 The inability to share details of their work can also encourage police 
officers to lie to people far and wide. Officers working in the SDS and the NPOIU 
carried out long-term deployments, usually lasting about five years. On leaving the 
field, they built stories that could avert the risk of activists maintaining contact with 
them, by pretending to move abroad to take up a new job, flee from the police or start 
a new life.72 Peripheral members within the targeted groups, who posed no real threat 
to society and who may have developed genuine friendships with undercover officers, 
were also on the receiving end of this deception and ‘collateral intrusion.’73 
 Undercover activities therefore represent a double-edged sword that helps 
maintain the sociopolitical status quo and defend the State from its ‘enemies’, while 
negating the British philosophical principle of ‘policing by consent’ and displaying 
the irony of requiring secrecy “to defend the transparent democracy we all hope to 
live in.” 74  Here, there are important tensions between the “limited secrecy and 
deception [that] can be legitimate to police work [… and the] crucial moral questions 
[…] of possible harm, unfairness, and [the] undermining of trust.”75 These tensions 
find particular salience in the dichotomous relationship between pragmatic versus 
idealistic views of State action. On the one hand, a typically orthodox security-
oriented position is encapsulated by the late George Kennedy Young, a former deputy 
director of the Secret Intelligence Service, who argued that “acts of government are 
not choices between good and bad. They are between two evils – the lesser of the two 
evils. Someone is always going to get hurt by a decision of government [… and] 
absolute morality, absolute ethics just does not exist in affairs of the state.”76 On the 
other hand, ethical perspectives propose that ‘just intelligence principles’77 should 
underpin intelligence collection – a proposition that the security apparatus might find 
oxymoronic.78 These principles maintain that “harm is only justified when there is a 
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threat of sufficient proportion, recognized by those whose responsibility it is to 
protect the people, used against those who are justified targets and conducted with the 
intention of protection and self-defence.”79 
The ambiguities and the grey areas of the covert world do not only emerge 
from the inherently political and historically contingent definition of subversion, 
terrorism and extremism and from the ethical dilemmas associated with secret 
operations. They also emerge from the increasingly close relationship between state 
intelligence and corporate security. They demonstrate the “growing value of 
information as capital in power relations”80 and are exemplified by the increasing 
partnerships between the public and the private sectors around security (e.g. in cyber-
security81 or in surveillance82). Western States have often aligned their own interests 
with corporate interests, resulting in close cooperation between law enforcement 
agencies, intelligence agencies and corporations to collect intelligence on, and disrupt 
the activities of, activists who seek to undermine the foundations of capitalist 
society.83 This alignment of interests results from the loss of monopoly over policing 
that the public police used to hold in the nineteenth century. 84  Throughout the 
twentieth century, the police had to face public demands for increased police 
presence; the liberalizing powers of the Police Act 1994, which introduced private 
security; and the commodification of policing activities as a result of both state 
financial constraints and the changing face of social demographics and public 
spaces.85 As a consequence, today’s policing is operationalized via a networked plural 
provision86 that functions within a ‘nodal governance’, insofar as 
 
 Governance is not performed simply by institutions of the state, nor 
shaped solely by thinking originating from the state sphere. Today, 
ways of imagining and realizing security governance in the business 
sector as well as the ‘third sector’ (e.g. community groupings, non-
governmental organizations) shape and influence the thinking of state 
institutions and vice versa.87 
 
The commodification of both policing and the police role in defending the status quo 
speaks of a conservative culture whereby the police are expected to preserve law and 
order and to represent the dominant social morality.88 In this sense, the activities of 
the police (and the security services too) are never truly politically neutral or 
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independent. While the police may not intentionally be involved in partisan politics, 
their activities impact on a plethora of groups and individuals who are the focus of 
law enforcement whether by reason of class, ethnicity or gender or other types of 
inequalities.89 Insofar as they regulate subversive groups and maintain order during 
demonstrations or industrial disputes, “some police tasks are avowedly concerned 
with the control of behavior which is explicitly political in motivation and intended 
impact.”90 Revelations that British police infiltrated and disrupted left-wing and/or 
radical political groups have sparked outrage among a section of the public; however, 
they are not a novelty in the policing landscape. British security authorities have for a 
long time used undercover officers, wiretaps and provocation – and these are well 
exemplified by Special Branch’s engineering of the ‘Walsall bomb plot’ in 1982 as 
part of a wider plan to discredit anarchists.91 Acts of state repression, collusion and 
deception later reached a peak, during ‘The Troubles’ (1968–1998) in Northern 
Ireland, which is yet to be surpassed on the British mainland.92  
Surveillance, manipulation and dirty tricks have indeed been employed in 
every liberal country in Europe and North America.93 In the late 1960s and early 
1970s, American society faced threats of vocal and aggressive dissent that resulted in 
the police using planted informers to garner intelligence on the membership, 
motivations and goals of several target groups. 94 At that time, “police infiltration 
[was] much more common than the public generally assume[d].”95 This statement, 
dated 1970, could not be any truer given the public revelations of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI)’s COunter INTELligence PROgram (COINTELPRO). Via a 
series of controversial covert operations carried out between 1956 and 1971, 
COINTELPRO extended its gaze well beyond the strict realm of criminality96 and 
“did not refrain from engaging in snitch-jacketing, encouraging gang warfare, 
fabricating evidence, stealing membership lists and, more broadly, employing 
improper and illegal means.” 97  Notwithstanding a charter forbidding it from 
monitoring American citizens in the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) also became involved in domestic counterintelligence operations against anti-
war groups. Known as ‘CHAOS’, these operations ran between 1967 and 1974 and 
were conducted in cooperation with the FBI and on direct orders from President 
Lyndon Johnson and his successor President Richard Nixon.98 The CIA allegedly had 
sources on the material support that radical anti-war groups protesting against the 
Vietnam War were giving to Soviet intelligence services and assisted the FBI in 
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running counterintelligence operations. ‘CHAOS’ entailed the investigation and 
clearance of 7000 American anti-war protesters and intensive surveillance of “several 
hundred suspected of channeling East bloc resources into the most radical groups 
operating in the United States.”99  
The anti-Vietnam-War movements in the United States were eventually 
cleared of foreign influence and, between 1972 and 1974, ‘CHAOS’ turned its focus 
from the anti-war movement to tackling international terrorism.100 And yet, a news 
report published in the New York Times in 1974 tapped into public anxieties about 
surveillance, when ‘CHAOS’ was presented as a “massive illegal domestic 
intelligence operation […] against the antiwar movement and other dissident 
groups.”101 At that time, the SDS had been operating for just six years, in a political 
climate in which the communist and the ‘far and wide left’ threat was already a long-
standing concern for government. The next section explores this threat and the ways 
in which worries about betrayals, infiltrations and subversions gripped the British 
security apparatus during and after the Cold War, eventually providing a historical 
understanding of the ‘enemies’ that the British State was seeking to neutralize 
throughout that period. 
 
The Evergreen Communist and ‘Far and Wide Left’ Threats 
Counterintelligence and security activities targeting people closely associated or 
sympathizing with communism and the Soviet Union were part and parcel of 
everyday life during the Cold War (1945–1991). Nonetheless, Soviet espionage 
certainly predates this period, having taken place on British102 soil since at least the 
1920s.103 Soviet espionage found its highest manifestation in the betrayal of Secret 
Intelligence Service officer Kim Philby and resulted in a long-lasting effect on the 
confidence of the security apparatus and an evergreen paranoia that still haunts the 
memory of the late Roger Hollis, director general of the Security Service between 
1956 and 1965 and alleged to have been a Soviet agent. 104  Soviet intelligence 
activities in the United Kingdom were organized around a threefold strategy: using 
legal residents who enjoyed diplomatic status in the Russian Embassy; embedding 
illegal residents who would operate as sleeper agents with false identities, under non-
official cover (also known as ‘illegals’); and utilizing a secret group in the Communist 
Party of Great Britain (CPGB).105  
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Several cases of espionage marked British history between the 1930s and the 
late 1960s. Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Anthony Blunt and John 
Cairncross were part of the ‘Cambridge Spy Ring,’ while James Klugmann played the 
role of talent-spotter and mentor, 106 and between them they operated between the 
1930s and the early 1950s. Gordon Lonsdale, Harry Houghton, Ethel Gee, Morris 
Cohen and Lona Cohen formed part of the ‘Portland Spy Ring,’107 an illegal program 
that operated between the late 1950s and 1961. The 1960s saw the conviction of 
twelve British people, including the notable cases of John Vassall and George Blake, 
for passing secrets to the Soviet Union.108 In 1963, the infamous ‘Profumo Affair,’109 
involving Secretary of State for War John Profumo, the young model Christine Keeler 
and Soviet intelligence officer Yevgeny Ivanov, became one of the most significant 
political scandals of that decade.  
Concerns about Soviet infiltration pervaded security circles until at least 1971, 
when ‘Operation FOOT’ led to a mass expulsion of 105 Soviet intelligence officers 
working under diplomatic cover in the country.110 The operation halved the number of 
hostile Russian intelligence personnel operating in London and “enhanced the 
Service’s prestige with its foreign friends and allies.”111 It greatly diminished Soviet 
intelligence’s firepower but did not entirely dispel its threat. In fact, the Soviet Union 
continued to target the United Kingdom both directly and via allied intelligence 
agencies.112 The Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) spent much effort 
targeting the intelligence services, the civil service, the Labour Party and trade unions, 
requiring the Security Service and Special Branch to work strenuously and efficiently 
to uncover and apprehend spies and traitors. Two Czechoslovakian defectors, named 
Josef Frolik and Frantisek August, provided material on the penetration of the Labour 
Party and the trade unions in the 1960s and 1970s.113 The late Will Owen and Tom 
Driberg were two Labour Members of Parliament (MPs) who were at least 
sympathetic toward, and possibly even passed information to, Czechoslovakian 
intelligence services.114 Similarly, the late Jack Jones, former general secretary of the 
Transport and General Workers Union, passed Labour Party documents to KGB 
officer Nikolai Berdenikov115 until 1984.116 Prominent pro-Soviet trade unionists, and 
often “honoured guests in Eastern bloc countries,”117 were Ted Hill, also a secret 
member of the CPGB, Ernie Roberts, Hugh Scanlon and Richard Briginshaw.118 
Engineer Michael John Smith passed documents acquired during his work at 
Thorn-EMI Research Establishment, a List X firm conducting secret research for the 
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Ministry of Defence, to the KGB between 1975 and 1979 and during his work at 
General Electric Company’s Hirst Research Centre, another List X company, to the 
Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (SVR) between 1990 and 1992, when he was eventually 
arrested. This became “the most important espionage case in Britain still unresolved 
at the end of the Cold War.”119 In 1982, Geoffrey Prime was arrested for having 
passed copies of hundreds of secret documents from Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) to the KGB in the 1970s.120 One year later, Michael Bettaney, 
a Security Service officer with a peculiar history of fare dodging, alcoholism and pro-
Nazi views, was arrested after delivering secret documents to the KGB in London.121 
In the late 1980s, the Security Service discovered Vaclav Jelinek, an ‘illegal’ of the 
Statni Bezpecnost (the secret police of the former Czechoslovakia). He had been 
posing as Dutch hotelier and art-dealer Erwin Van Haarlem and his arrest led to “the 
last major espionage trial of the Thatcher era and the first of an illegal since Gordon 
Lonsdale [of the Portland Spy Ring] in 1961.”122 In the same period, Security Service 
officers were still untangling the extent of the Cambridge Spy Ring’s espionage case 
by interviewing people who had been active in the Cambridge University Communist 
Party and the Cambridge University Socialist Party in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Nowadays, the Security Service continues to be busy countering the intelligence 
activities of the SVR.123 
Historically, communist influences on political parties in the country were a 
natural target for the Security Service’s activities. Clandestine operations, known as 
‘STILL LIFE,’ were particularly effective in ensuring that the Security Service could 
“have covert access to all CP [Communist Party] offices in Britain and Northern 
Ireland,” copy thousands of documents and identify “90 per cent of the 35,000 
membership of the CPGB”124 by 1952. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, the Security 
Service employed around sixty desk officers, plus support staff, to gather information 
on the Party.125 Technical surveillance and the use of informants ensured a thorough 
penetration of the Party,126 thanks to the activities of the late Peter Wright, a Security 
Service principal scientist, and his team, which “bugged and burgled [their] way 
across London at the state’s behest, while pompous bowler-hatted civil servants in 
Whitehall pretended to look the other way.”127 
The decreasing support for communism and an era of heated social, racial and 
class conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s reprioritized some of the work of the counter-
subversion section (F Branch)128 of the Security Service, which shifted its attention to 
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Trotskyist movements. The Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Workers 
Revolutionary Party (WRP), Militant Tendency (MT) and other left-wing groups were 
therefore scrutinized, and the appointment of John Jones (a former star of F Branch) 
as director general of the Security Service in 1981 encapsulates this change in 
strategic direction. The early 1980s represented a period of political concerns about 
the so-called ‘far and wide left’ that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher believed had 
infiltrated the civil service, trade unions, universities, the Church and the broadcasting 
services. 129  Fascinated and mesmerized as she was by the intelligence world, 130 
Thatcher required the Security Service to increase its efforts against this target.131 
Against an enemy that was perceived to be so “diffuse, and its communications so 
widespread,”132 F Branch needed fewer restrictions on the use of telephone taps and 
letter intercepts. Therefore, it built a closer relationship with the Post Office, while an 
enthusiastic John Jones sought to endow it with the technical resources that were 
available to K Branch, the counter-espionage section.133 Therefore, “phone tapping 
became de rigueur in these years in an alarming way and was run by a unit called 
Tinkerbell Squad,”134 which targeted junior ministers and MPs such as Neil Kinnock, 
Bob Cryer and Michael Meacher (all Labour Party).135 
The clandestine, revolutionary Trotskyist group MT was formed in 1964 as an 
offshoot of the Revolutionary Socialist League and was inspired by the doctrines of 
Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky.136 For almost thirty years it proved to be a hostile 
enemy for the security apparatus. MT sought to infiltrate the Labour Party via 
parliamentary candidates who would routinely omit to mention their association with 
the group. MT acted as “a secret [, subversive] organization with a covert strategy 
designed to undermine the future of Labour as a democratic political party and turn it 
against the ‘parliamentary road to socialism.’”137 While it was smaller than the WRP 
and the International Socialist Group (ISG), MT was more influential. It managed 
Liverpool City Council in 1983, ran front organizations (e.g. Youth Against Racism) 
and took control of the Anti-Poll Tax Federation “through a series of dirty tricks, 
dodgy deals and phony groups claiming voting rights”138 that illuminated both MT’s 
ideological lineage connecting it to the CPGB and MT’s antagonistic relationship 
with the SWP and the anarchist factions.139 While the infamous riots of London in 
1990 exemplify MT’s sociopolitical threat, it is true that this threat would greatly 
diminish shortly afterwards.  
The group left the Labour Party in 1991, rebranding itself Militant Labour and 
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later, in 1997, the Socialist Party, and was thoroughly penetrated by SDS-officer-
turned-whistleblower Peter Black (an alias for Peter Francis).140 MT abandoned its 
well-oiled entryist strategy in late 1992 and saw a reduction in numbers to fewer than 
a thousand. The tensions between the director of F Branch, who wished to make a 
case for continuing telephone and letter intercepts at the party’s headquarters, and 
desk officers, such as Annie Machon and Sarah Knight (F2B/4), who recommended 
discontinuing all communications intercepts, demonstrate the ambiguities that gnaw 
at security-related decisions in a politically sensitive arena.141  
Yet Trotskyist groups were unsympathetic to the Eastern bloc and did not 
have any allegiance to foreign powers, possibly failing to meet the standards for an 
investigation for subversion. Some of these groups were also not necessarily 
“building bombs in smoky backrooms, but were instead using legitimate democratic 
methods to make their case, such as standing in elections, organising demonstrations 
and ‘educating’ the workers.” 142  Meanwhile, the CPBG splintered into the 
Democratic Left and the Marxist–Leninist-oriented Communist Party of Britain in 
1988. With about a thousand members (many were over sixty-five years of age) and 
having been penetrated for thirty years by officer M148, the Communist Party was 
rendered largely ineffective.143 
In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended. The following 
year the Security Service made “a successful transition from a mainly anti-subversive 
agency to the lead anti-terrorist organization.”144 However, it still retained an anti-
Cold-War mentality, which is encapsulated in former director general Stella 
Rimington’s recollections of “going around listening to people’s telephones and 
opening their mail and stuff.”145 Similarly, the criteria used by the Security Service to 
record subversives and their sympathizers did not differ too much from the criteria set 
out by Home Secretary David Maxwell-Fyfe in 1952. Election lists, subscription to 
left-wing clubs and participation in demonstrations were used as ‘proof’ of 
membership of, or sympathy toward, subversive groups. Two of the most significant 
critical voices about the operations of the Security Service are Annie Machon and her 
former partner David Shayler. They both worked as Security Service officers between 
1991 and 1996, before making public revelations of alleged malpractices within the 
Security Service.146 In her book Spies, Lies and Whistleblowers: MI5, MI6 and the 
Shayler Affair, Machon suggests that, from 1952, 
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MI5 and subsequent governments used to argue that all members of 
certain parties – such as the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) 
or later the bewildering array of Trotskyists, with names like the 
International Marxist Group (IMG), Workers Revolutionary Party 
(WRP) Major and Minor, Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP) and 
Revolutionary Communist Group (RCG), anarchists and the extreme 
right – were threats to the security of the state or our democratic 
system.147 
 
Fears of a communist and ‘far and wide left’ threat to the State and democracy indeed 
continued throughout and after the Cold War. While security authorities posit that the 
focus of their investigations was not specific organizations or their members but the 
penetration and influence of subversives within political groups,148 it is certainly true 
that real and perceived political views were on occasion equated with security 
threats.149 The curious Personal Files (PFs) recording as “?communist sympathizer” a 
schoolboy who had mailed the Communist Party for information on a topic that he 
was studying at school and a woman whose divorcing husband had accused her of 
being a communist in a letter to the Security Service are two prime examples.150 
Overall, the security apparatus produced about half a million files on communists and 
their sympathizers, which resulted in just a few prosecutions.151 
Cabinet ministers Harriet Harman152 and Patricia Hewitt were placed under 
surveillance due to their role as leading members of the National Council for Civil 
Liberties (NCCL – today known as Liberty), which was suspected of being a 
communist front organization.153 Celebrities, people working in the media, prominent 
politicians and members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), 
Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp and groups active in trade unionism and 
industrial disputes had their own PFs.154 In the 1990s, membership of the Communist 
Party resulted in individuals having a record citing “member: subversive; 
communist,” having vetting clearance in the public service of the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) withdrawn in secret and, in turn, being quietly moved to a 
position lacking access to sensitive material.155 Conversely, former members of the 
Socialist Party were cleared of allegations of subversion.156 
At the same time, the Security Service and Special Branch maintained an 
interest in anarchist activities. The anarchist organization Class War emerged in the 
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1980s, following an increase in disorder and political violence in the 1960s157 and a 
breakdown of law and order fomented by anti-government groups in the 1970s.158 It 
sought to connect “the inner city rioters of Brixton and Handsworth with the striking 
miners”159 and to overthrow parliamentary democracy.160 Drawing inspiration from 
the anti-capitalist ‘Stop the City’ demonstrations of 1983 and 1984, it launched a 
series of campaigns called ‘Bash the Rich’ and was aimed at intimidating wealthy 
people. While the absence of headquarters made phone intercepts impossible, security 
authorities utilized an alternative tactic to monitor the group. In or around 1988, 
officer M2589 from the SDS penetrated Class War, where he exerted considerable 
influence and was most likely able to supply information on the planning of the Poll 
Tax riots that would hit London in 1990. The termination of the officer’s deployment, 
and with it the organizational skills that he had brought to Class War, led to the 
collapse of a group that Machon describes as “a disorganized collection of around 200 
anarchist individuals [posing] no real threat to Parliamentary democracy or national 
security.”161 The moribund status of Class War later led to recommendations that the 
police officer not be replaced and that the Security Service simply maintain a 
‘watching brief.’162  
The SWP, the WRP and splinter left-wing groups were also thoroughly 
monitored by the security apparatus, although not without difficulties. The 
promiscuous lifestyle that members of these groups were undertaking made Security 
Service officers unwilling to undertake the necessary sacrifices to target them.163 The 
SDS took a more direct route into these groups, adhering to its motto ‘by all means 
necessary’ in order to honor the demands of intelligence gathering. The Special 
Demonstration Squad Tradecraft Manual provided “informal tacit authority and 
guidance for officers faced with the prospect of a sexual relationship”164 and attested 
that, in the absence of other options, they “should try to have fleeting, disastrous 
relationships with individuals who are not important to your sources of 
information.”165 Intimate relationships between undercover police officers and targets 
or their associates remain laden with moral, legal and operational ambiguities166 and 
endanger concepts and practices of ethical proportionality.167 Former commander of 
the MPSB Roger Pearce posits that the length of deployments and the life that officers 
were living inevitably led some officers to escalate false friendships into intimate 
relationships.168 Former MPS undercover officer James Bannon,169 who infiltrated the 
hooligan firm the Millwall Bushwackers in the late 1980s, at a time when “many 
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forces had covert units working against extreme football hooliganism, which used the 
same methodology of long-term infiltration of the SDS and NPOIU,” 170  takes a 
similar stance. He postulates that precluding deep-cover officers from engaging in 
intimate relationships, as a last resort to gain acceptance and/or gather information on 
the target group, could be operationally unviable. But others, such as Stephen 
Bentley, a former undercover officer who infiltrated a drugs gang as part of 
‘Operation Julie’ in the mid-1970s, 171  and a former operative in the MPS’s 
professional undercover unit (Specialist Operations Ten, or SO10, which is now 
known as, and part of, Specialist Crime & Operations, or SC&O10) have voiced 
grave concerns about the tactic.172  
As noted elsewhere, 173  intimate relationships fostered out of necessity, 
genuine love or passion have characterized both the British context (SDS and 
NPOIU) and the American context. In the latter context, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) officers, who were infiltrating the radical left-wing Weather 
Underground Organization in the 1970s, and Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) 
officers, who were infiltrating Maoist political groups in the 1970s and 1980s, forged 
intimate relationships with members of their target groups. But it is true that “while 
many American federal agencies could dismiss agents who had become sexually 
involved with targets to avoid compromising the agent himself/herself and/or tainting 
the evidence, different police units had different rules and guidelines.” 174  In the 
United Kingdom, in late 2015 the MPS eventually apologized to, and compensated, 
seven women who had had intimate relationships with SDS and NPOIU officers.175 
The Security Service found that recruiting agents within extreme left-wing 
groups was a difficult task too, due to the risks of publicity and scandal.176 The ‘old 
guard’ trained to defeat the Soviet intelligence services was particularly frustrated at 
having to devote time and effort to chasing minor groups in an age progressively 
dominated by computers. 177  Veterans of ‘D’ Branch (non-terrorist organizations 
section) considered the SWP and the WRP unworthy of the Security Service’s 
attention: these groups lacked links with foreign powers178 and, therefore, did not 
pose a direct threat of espionage and subversion. Special Branch maintained an 
interest in these groups insofar as their aggressive tactics mandated police to prevent 
public disorder and political violence. The SWP occupied “the revolutionary ground 
that they contended the CPGB had abandoned,” engaged in “increasingly militant 
union action between 1972 and 1974” and sought “the return to true proletarian revolt 
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in authentic Bolshevik style.”179 It was thoroughly penetrated by the SDS.180 And yet, 
its brand of revolutionary socialism still managed to infiltrate the 1976–1978 
Grunwick dispute, turning peaceful demonstrations into disorderly and violent 
confrontations with the police. This dispute is just one of many occasions in which 
police took a proactive approach to maintaining the peace by deploying its covert 
wing, the Special Branch, to monitor meetings, rallies and protest activities. The 
forthcoming Part II of this paper will explore some of the several left-wing and/or 
radical protest groups that the security apparatus monitored in order to neutralize real 
and perceived political and criminal threats to the State and society, with a particular 
focus on the pacifist, anti-war and anti-apartheid movements, groups involved in 
industrial disputes and the environmental and animal rights movement.                                                           
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